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urrency debacles in Mexico in 1994-
95 and in Asia in 1997-98 suggest that
exchange-rate policies may be very im-
portant for these economies. Some economists
go so far as to argue that, for many small coun-
tries, the choice of an exchange-rate system
may be their single most important macroeco-
nomic policy decision.
and the remaining 73 followed more
flexible arrangements, such as man-
aged or independent floating (see Dif-
ferent Types of Exchange-Rate Regimes
for a short description of the different
systems). Even among the more homo-
geneous group of 29 countries that
make up the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), six were pegging their cur-
rencies, 12 followed arrangements of
independent or managed floating, and
11 had just formed a monetary union
in which they adopted a common cur-
rency, the euro, which will be the sole
legal tender by 2002.
Exchange-rate arrangements
vary across time as well as across coun-
tries. For instance, at the start of the
20th century, most Western countries￿
currencies were rigidly fixed to gold,
under the system known as the gold
standard, which collapsed with the
outbreak of World War I. In the 1930s,
many countries, facing the hardships of
the Great Depression, opted for more
flexibility and decided to let market
forces determine the value of their cur-
rencies.1  Then, in 1945, the architects
of the Bretton Woods system  struck a
compromise by creating a system of
fixed, but adjustable exchange rates, in
an attempt to combine the benefits of
the gold standard with those of flexible
exchange rates (see The Bretton Woods
Exchange-Rate System).
Countries spend much time
and effort devising exchange-rate ar-
rangements. One reason is that
policymakers hope that the right ex-
change-rate system will help stabilize
their economies. A stable economic
environment decreases the amount of
The post-World War II experience of
industrial countries, however, paints a
different picture of the importance of
exchange-rate policies for an
economy￿s performance. In fact, the
exchange-rate system mattered surpris-
ingly little for the performance of these
economies.
The debate over the benefits
of different exchange-rate systems goes
back a long way. In the 1940s, some
economists argued that exchange rates
determined by market forces would be
very unstable ￿ they would experi-
ence wild and erratic movements
driven mostly by the speculative mo-
tives of investors. Critics of such flex-
ible exchange-rate systems feared that
the uncertainty created by these
movements in exchange rates would
lead to a fall in trade between nations
and, thus, to lower standards of living.
Nobel laureate Milton Friedman dis-
agreed forcefully with that view. In an
important essay, which influenced the
decision to adopt a system of flexible
exchange rates in the early 1970s,
Friedman argued that as long as under-
lying economic conditions are stable,
there is no presumption that exchange
rates will move excessively.
Although much has been
written on the subject, the debate is
far from settled. Indeed, the sheer
number of different exchange-rate sys-
tems currently in place in the world
demonstrates that policymakers dis-
agree on the merits of different ex-
change-rate arrangements. For in-
stance, as of June 1999, the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund reported that 67
countries pegged their currency, eight
adhered to a currency board arrange-
ment, 37 either used the currency of
another country as the sole legal ten-






Fed. 1 For a thorough account of the gold standard
and the interwar period, see the book by Barry
Eichengreen.  Business Review  Q1 2001   17 www.phil.frb.org
uncertainty people face when they
have to make economic decisions such
as how much to plant this season, how
much to expand a factory, or how
much to save for retirement. Is one
particular exchange-rate system associ-
ated with a more stable economic en-
vironment? To shed some light on this
question, we will review what hap-
pened historically to the volatility of
certain macroeconomic variables for
some industrial countries under differ-
ent exchange-rate mechanisms. We
will focus our attention on the Bretton
Woods system of fixed, but adjustable
exchange rates, in place from 1945 to
1971, and on the period since 1973,
during which most industrial countries
opted for flexible exchange rates.2 We
will see that, as the critics argued
would happen, flexible exchange rates
have been extremely volatile, but pre-
dictions of lower trade volumes, lower
output, and lower standards of living
failed to come true. Indeed, the vola-
tility of exchange rates affected econo-
mies surprisingly little, whether we




Let￿s begin our investigation
of how the exchange-rate mechanism
affects macroeconomic variables by
looking at some plots describing how
those variables moved over time from
1957 to 1999.3 One important variable
is the real exchange rate. People usu-
ally think about nominal exchange
rates, which denote the price of one
currency in terms of another. For in-
stance, in January 1999 one U.S. dollar
was worth 113 Japanese yen, but in
January 2000, the U.S. dollar traded
for 105 Japanese yen. Therefore, the
dollar lost 7.1 percent of its value
against the yen over that year, that is,
the nominal exchange rate fell 7.1 per-
cent. The real exchange rate, on the
other hand, represents the relative
prices of goods in two countries. A
common measure used to calculate the
real exchange rate is the nominal ex-
change rate multiplied by the ratio of
consumer price indexes in the two
countries. From January 1999 to Janu-
ary 2000, the consumer price index
rose 3 percent more in the United
States than in Japan, so the real ex-
change rate declined only 4.1 per-
cent.4 In other words, while $1.00
could buy 7.1 percent fewer yen in
January 2000 than in January 1999,
$1.00 of U.S. goods could be traded for
4.1 percent fewer Japanese goods in
January 2000 than a year before.
The real exchange rate￿s vola-
tility measures the extent to which the
relative price of two countries￿ goods
fluctuates over time. Since most coun-
tries switched from fixed to flexible
nominal exchange rates in the early
1970s, real exchange rates have be-
come much more volatile, as critics of
flexible exchange rates predicted (Fig-
ure 1).5 However, the volatility of
many other economic variables has not
changed as much (Figure 2).6 If an
E
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xchange-Rate Arrangement with No Separate Legal Tender: Under
this arrangement, two possible cases emerge. First, the currency of
another country is used as the sole legal tender; for example, Panama
uses the U.S. dollar. Second, the country may belong to a monetary
union in which members of the union share the same legal tender; for
example, the European countries that belong to the European Monetary
Union share a common currency, the euro.
Currency Board Arrangement: In this case, the country is bound by law to exchange
domestic currency for a particular foreign currency at a fixed exchange rate. Argentina
uses this arrangement, exchanging one peso for one U.S. dollar.
Other Conventional Fixed Peg Arrangements: The country pegs its currency to that
of another country or to a basket of currencies. Typically, the arrangement allows the
exchange rate to fluctuate within a narrow band around a central rate.
Crawling Peg: As in the previous case, the country pegs its currency to that of
another country, but it revises the exchange rate periodically at a fixed, pre-an-
nounced rate. Costa Rica uses a crawling peg system.
Managed Floating: The monetary authority of the country intervenes actively in the
foreign-exchange market to influence the movements of the exchange rate. The
monetary authority, however, does not specify or pre-commit to any particular value
for the exchange rate.
Independent Floating: For the most part, the market determines the exchange rate of
a country. The monetary authority rarely, if ever, intervenes in the foreign exchange
market. England has a freely floating exchange rate.
2 This article does not study the period between
August 1971 and March 1973 when the major
industrial countries￿ currencies evolved under
the Smithsonian Agreement.
3 The sample studied starts in 1957 instead of
1945 because many economic series are
unavailable before that date.
4 In January 1999, the consumer price index in
the United States was 164.7, and the consumer
price index in Japan was 102, implying a real
exchange rate of 182.5: the nominal exchange
rate of 113 yen per U.S. dollar times the ratio of
U.S. to Japanese price indexes. By January 2000,
however, the U.S. consumer price index had
risen to 169.1 while that in Japan had fallen to
101.5, resulting in a fall of the real exchange
rate to 174.9.
5 All variables have been detrended by taking
the first difference of their logarithms; that is,
we look at growth rates. For purposes of
exposition, in Figures 1 and 2 the period
between August 1971 and March 1973 is
included with the flexible exchange-rate period.
6 See the article by Marianne Baxter and Alan
Stockman for a more exhaustive study.18   Q1 2001 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
observer didn￿t know the date on
which the Bretton Woods system fell,
it would be hard to tell from plots of
industrial production when these
countries switched to a flexible ex-
change-rate system. The same is true
of other macroeconomic variables, in-
cluding consumption, investment, or
net exports.
Although a picture may be
worth a thousand words, looking solely
at figures like these may be deceiving.
Table 1 reports the volatility of the real
exchange rate between three countries
and the United States, as well as, for
each country, the volatility of its indus-
trial production, consumption, invest-
ment, and net exports (all in inflation-
adjusted terms) in the flexible ex-
change-rate period relative to their
volatility in the Bretton Woods pe-
riod.7 The table demonstrates that ex-
cept for the real exchange rate, these
economic variables are about equally
volatile under the two different ex-
without similar increases in the volatil-
ity of other economic variables and
with no adverse effect on trade vol-
umes or standards of living, constitutes
an important puzzle in international
economics. The reason is that econo-
mists generally think that relative
prices, like the real exchange rate,
matter for allocating scarce resources
efficiently.
Imagine, for a moment, that
the U.S. economy does not trade with
any other country and the relative
price of cars suddenly increases. This
increase would give people an incen-
tive to switch expenditures from cars
to other goods in the economy, there-
fore lowering production and employ-
ment in the car industry.
In theory, real exchange rates
work just like the relative price of cars
in the example above. The only differ-
ence is that the real exchange rate rep-
resents the relative price of goods be-
tween countries. Imagine now that the
I
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n 1944, delegates from 44 countries met at
Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, to reform the
international monetary system.a The delegates
wanted to design a system that would combine
the benefits of both flexible and fixed ex-
change-rate systems. The result was a system of
fixed, but adjustable, nominal exchange rates.
Under the system, the U.S. dollar was fixed in terms of gold
(initially at $35 per ounce), and the U.S. Treasury bought
and sold gold to maintain this official price. In turn, every
other member country was to fix its currency to the dollar
(and indirectly to gold) and keep its exchange rate within a
1 percent range on either side of the parity by buying or
selling U.S. dollars in the foreign-exchange market. Only in
the face of a significant and long-lasting deficit or surplus in
its balance of payments was a country allowed to adjust the
parity of its currency. Thus, the goal was to enjoy the
stability associated with fixed exchange rates while
simultaneously retaining the ability to move the nominal
exchange rate when necessary to restore equilibrium in the
balance of payments.
The system essentially collapsed in August 1971,
when the U.S. suspended its promise to exchange gold for
dollars at the official price.b Many elements contributed to
the fall of Bretton Woods, but an important one concerned
the liquidity of the system. Under the agreement, the U.S.
Treasury fixed the price of the U.S. dollar in terms of gold by
buying and selling gold on the market. In other words, the
U.S. promised to exchange U.S. dollars for gold at the official
price of $35 per ounce. The system collapsed when other
countries no longer believed that the U.S. could keep its
promise to exchange U.S. dollars for gold at the official price.
In the 1960s, U.S. reserves of gold steadily declined while the
amount of U.S. liabilities to foreigners increased. That is,
there were more and more U.S. dollars in circulation for every
ounce of gold, putting more strain on the capacity of the
United States to honor the agreement. Other countries,
which had accumulated U.S. dollars, became afraid that the
dollar would be devalued in terms of gold, and they started to
convert their holdings of dollars into gold. In August 1971,
President Richard Nixon suspended the convertibility of
dollars into gold, which essentially ended the Bretton Woods
system.
change-rate regimes. Certainly, since
1973 no variable has experienced an
increase in its volatility similar to that
of real exchange rates. Moreover, the
increase in exchange-rate volatility did
not lead to a fall in international trade
and to lower standards of living, as
critics of flexible exchange rates feared.
In fact, the relationship between ex-
change-rate regimes and economic
growth does not appear to be strong.8
SHOULD WE CARE ABOUT THE
REAL EXCHANGE RATE?
The increase in the volatility
of real exchange rates since 1973,
7 The results are not affected if we look at the
variability of real exchange rates vis-￿-vis a
currency other than the U.S. dollar.
8 See the article by Atish Gosh, Anne-Marie
Gulde, Jonathan Ostry, and Holger Wolf.
a A collection of articles on the workings of the Bretton Woods system
can be found in the book by Michael Bordo and Barry Eichengreen.
b In 1971, however, the industrial countries were not yet ready to
implement a system of flexible exchange rates. Under the Smithsonian
Agreement, signed in December 1971, they adopted a system similar in
spirit to that of Bretton Woods, although it allowed the exchange rates
to fluctuate more.  That system collapsed in March 1973.  Business Review  Q1 2001   19 www.phil.frb.org
U.S. economy opens up to trade, and
suppose that the relative price of U.S.
goods increases (i.e., the real exchange
rate appreciates). Just like the increase
in the relative price of cars in the pre-
vious example, the appreciation of the
real exchange rate for U.S. goods
should be associated with a shift in
world demand away from  U.S. prod-
ucts toward foreign-produced goods
and, consequently, production and em-
ployment in the United States would
fall.
These potentially large move-
ments in production and employment
are what concern international econo-
mists and policymakers. According to
this simple theory, movements in real
exchange rates should coincide with
movements in resources in the world
economy. So if the volatility of the real
exchange rate increases, the volatility
of other economic variables, such as
output or consumption, should also
increase. However, as the discussion
above showed, this clearly did not hap-
pen after 1973. Economists have been
trying to solve this puzzle for some
time now. Our search for a solution
will be helped by learning whether the
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choice of exchange-rate systems affects
the volatility of real exchange rates, or
vice versa.
WHAT CAUSES WHAT?
Higher volatility of real ex-
change rates is associated with a flex-
ible exchange-rate system. But what is
cause and what is effect? Could it be
that real exchange rates have become
more variable since 1973 because the
underlying circumstances affecting the
economy have also become more vari-
able, and consequently, countries de-
cided to adopt a flexible exchange-rate
system to insulate their economies
from external shocks? Interestingly, the
adoption of a flexible exchange-rate
system in the early 1970s coincided
with the first OPEC oil-price shock.
Thus, real exchange rates may have
become more volatile since 1973 be-
cause world economies have been sub-
ject to more real shocks, of which oil-
price shocks are a prime example, and
countries responded to these real
shocks by moving to a flexible ex-
change-rate system. Perhaps the more
volatile real exchange rate and the
adoption of a flexible exchange-rate
system resulted from an increase in the
size of shocks to the economy. Al-
though we do not have formal statisti-
cal results proving or disproving this
case, the historical experience of
Canada and Ireland shows that this is
unlikely.
In 1950, Canada decided to
leave the Bretton Woods system of
fixed, but adjustable, exchange rates
because it had difficulty setting a stable
and credible exchange rate. The Cana-
dian government had increased the
value of the Canadian dollar, relative
to other currencies, in 1946 and de-
creased it in 1949. In October 1950,
facing strong market pressures toward
an appreciation, Canada decided to let
its currency float. The Canadian ex-
change rate was flexible until early
1962, when Canada rejoined the
Bretton Woods system. Comparing the
behavior of the Canadian exchange
rate during these different periods
shows that it is likely that the choice of
exchange-rate system influences the
behavior of a country￿s real exchange
rate (Figure 3). The volatility of the
Canadian real exchange rate was much
lower when Canada was part of the
Bretton Woods system in the 1960s
than it has been under the current re-
gime or than it was in the 1950s. In
fact, each time the Canadian currency
has been allowed to float, the real ex-
change rate has been roughly three
times more volatile than it was under
the Bretton Woods system (Table 2).
Ireland￿s experience provides
another example of the effects of the
exchange-rate system on the economy.
Until the end of 1978, the Irish pound
was pegged to the British pound. But
in January 1979, Ireland joined the
European Monetary System (EMS), in
which the Irish pound was effectively
tied to the German mark. As in the
Canadian case, the volatility of the
real exchange rate between two coun-
tries is closely linked to the type of ex-
change-rate arrangement these coun-
tries follow (Table 3). Since the Irish
pound was allowed to float against the
British currency in 1979, the real ex-
change rate between Ireland and the
UK has been more than twice as vola-
tile as it was in the period from 1973 to
1978, when the currencies were tied to
each other. The opposite pattern
emerges between Ireland and Ger-
many: after the Irish pound was essen-
tially tied to the German mark in
1979, the volatility of the real ex-
change rate between Ireland and Ger-
many fell by nearly one-half.
TABLE TABLE TABLE TABLE TABLE 1: Ratio of V  1: Ratio of V  1: Ratio of V  1: Ratio of V  1: Ratio of Volatility olatility olatility olatility olatility
Flexible Exchange-Rate Period Relative to Bretton Woods Period
Real Exchange Output Consumption Investment Net Exports
Rate
Canada 3.42 1.53 1.03 1.18 0.79
Japan 8.84 0.81 1.04 0.74 0.70
United Kingdom 3.03 1.31 0.99 0.94 0.88
United States 0.71 0.95 1.02 0.92
Sources: IMF International Financial Statistics, DRI, and Statistics Canada
The volatility of a variable is measured by the standard deviation of quarter-to-quarter growth
rates of that variable. Quarter-to-quarter growth rates are calculated as the change from each
quarter to the next in the logarithm of the variable.
The Bretton Woods period covers 1957Q1 to 1970Q4, while the flexible exchange-rate period
covers 1973Q1 to 1999Q4.
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From the experiences of
Canada and Ireland, it￿s apparent that
the change to a flexible exchange-rate
system causes increased volatility in
the real exchange rate, not vice versa.
WHY DO REAL EXCHANGE
RATES EXPERIENCE WILD
SWINGS?
One proposed explanation is
that market psychology, not economic
fundamentals like supply and demand,
causes nominal and real exchange
rates to move so much in a flexible
exchange-rate system. Under this ap-
proach, the exchange rate becomes a
self-fulfilling prophecy. For instance,
suppose that a trader in the foreign-
exchange market buys U.S. dollars be-
cause he expects the U.S. dollar to ap-
preciate. If all traders have the same
expectations and all decide to buy U.S.
dollars, their actions push the value of
the U.S. dollar up, confirming their
expectations. Thus, market psychology
can lead to exchange-rate volatility.
But, in general, people do not
like the uncertainty generated by more
volatile exchange rates. Some use
costly means, like hedging, to protect
themselves against it.9  Since the rest
of the economy behaves similarly un-
der fixed or flexible exchange-rate re-
gimes, fixing the nominal exchange
rate could thus be beneficial in avoid-
ing wild and irrational movements in
exchange rates and their hedging costs.
The market-psychology approach says
that, left to itself, the market for for-
eign exchange does not work very well
￿ exchange rates are too volatile,
which imposes costs on the economy.
Generally, however, economists believe
in market forces and prefer explana-
tions based on economic fundamentals
rather than psychology. Commenting
on the possibility that flexible ex-
change rates would be extremely un-
stable, Milton Friedman noted that
￿[the] advocacy of flexible exchange
rates is not equivalent to advocacy of
unstable exchange rates. The ultimate
objective is a world in which exchange
rates, while free to vary, are in fact
highly stable. Instability of exchange
rates is a symptom of instability in the
underlying economic structure.￿
Are the wild movements in
real exchange rates since the early
1970s consistent with theoretical mod-
els based on economic fundamentals?
The simplest model of exchange-rate
determination, known as purchasing
power parity, states that nominal ex-
change rates should move to offset in-
flation differentials across countries,
leaving real exchange rates constant
over time. This simple theory cannot
explain the high volatility of real ex-
change rates.
What is happening is that the
law of one price fails.10 The law of one
price states that a good should sell for
the same price in two different coun-
tries, when the prices are expressed in
the same currency, after adjusting for
tariffs and transport costs.  If that were
not the case, an individual would have
an incentive to buy the good in the
country where it is cheaper and sell it
in the other country, an action called
arbitrage in economic lingo. Such an
individual is referred to as an
arbitrageur.
TABLE TABLE TABLE TABLE TABLE 2: The Canadian Experience  2: The Canadian Experience  2: The Canadian Experience  2: The Canadian Experience  2: The Canadian Experience
Standard Deviation of the Real Exchange Rate
1950 - 1962 1962 - 1970 1971 - 1999
Real Exchange Rate 1.50 0.54 1.83
Source: Statistics Canada and DRI.
TABLE TABLE TABLE TABLE TABLE 3: The Irish Experience  3: The Irish Experience  3: The Irish Experience  3: The Irish Experience  3: The Irish Experience
Standard Deviation of the Real Exchange Rate
1973- 1978 1979 - 1999
Irish Pound / UK Pound 1.69 4.21
Irish Pound / German Mark 4.87 2.77
Source: DRI
The numbers reported are the standard deviation of quarter-to-quarter growth rates of the real
exchange rate. These quarter-to-quarter growth rates are calculated as the change from each
quarter to the next in the logarithm of the real exchange rate.
9 Hedging refers to the means investors and
firms take to protect themselves from possible
movements in currencies. For instance, suppose
an American firm exporting to Canada expects
to receive a payment of 100,000 Canadian dol-
lars in three months. To protect itself from the
possible depreciation of the Canadian dollar, the
American firm could hedge by entering into a
contract with a bank stipulating that the firm
agrees to sell 100,000 Canadian dollars for U.S.
dollars to the bank in three months, at a fixed
rate of exchange set at the time the contract is
agreed upon. Changes in the exchange rate
between the Canadian dollar and the U.S. dol-
lar during the three months will have no effect
on the firm￿s profits.
10 See the articles by Charles Engel and by John
Rogers and Michael Jenkins.22   Q1 2001 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
For instance, imagine that the
same computer sells for 2000 Canadian
dollars in Canada and for 1000 U.S.
dollars in the United States. Moreover,
suppose that 1 U.S. dollar can be ex-
changed for 1.5 Canadian dollars.
Therefore, converting the U.S. price of
the computer into Canadian dollars
using the exchange rate, we find that
1500 Canadian dollars could buy the
1000 U.S. dollars needed to acquire
this computer in the United States. To
keep the example simple, let￿s assume
there are no transport costs to ship a
computer from the United States to
Canada. An arbitrageur could make a
profit of 500 Canadian dollars (333
U.S. dollars) by buying the computer
in the United States and selling it in
Canada. With sufficient arbitrage,
prices, when expressed in the same
currency, should converge, since
arbitrageurs would raise the demand
for computers in the United States and
increase their supply in Canada.
If all sectors in the economy
produce freely traded products and sell
them in very competitive markets, the
law of one price should hold, after ad-
justing for transport costs, and real ex-
change rates should not vary much.
Rogers and Jenkins, however, found
that 81 percent of the movements in
real exchange rates are due to a failure
of the law of one price. Moreover,
Charles Engel and John Rogers showed
that, for a wide range of commodities,
the presence of transport costs cannot
account for failure of the law of one
price. This suggests that to better un-
derstand movements in real exchange
rates, we need to have a better under-




Economists have been trying
to develop a good model to explain the
facts about real exchange rates. One
important element of an explanation is
that prices are slow to adjust to
changes in the economy (often
referred to as price stickiness). For
instance, Figure 4 shows the nominal
and the real exchange rates between
Canada and the United States, as well
as the ratio of American to Canadian
prices (as measured by the consumer
price indexes). The high volatility of
exchange rates since the early 1970s,
combined with the nearly constant
ratio of foreign to domestic prices,
illustrates that the prices of goods are
slow to adjust to changes in the
economy, compared with financial
variables such as nominal exchange
rates.
Many researchers think that
any model of exchange rates should
include features that allow the prices
associated with highly volatile real
exchange rates. While this may explain
why real exchange rates are so volatile,
it doesn￿t explain why more volatile
real exchange rates aren￿t associated
with more volatile consumption,
output, and net exports. Therefore,
the sluggishness of prices doesn￿t
provide a full explanation of the
puzzle.
It turns out that an explana-
tion for the failure of the law of one
price can help us understand why
more volatile movements in the real
exchange rate are not associated with
more volatile economic fundamentals.
This explanation, first postulated by
Paul Krugman in a 1987 article, relies
on what is known as pricing-to-
market, which occurs when a firm sells
the same product at different prices in
different markets, as in our earlier
example of computer prices. To
determine if a firm set a different price
in different markets, we would need to
convert the price in one country into
the other country￿s currency, using the
exchange rate. A company might set
different prices in different countries
because of a difference in how strongly
quantity demanded reacts to a change
in price.
Of course, the extent to
which a company can price to market
may be limited by the possibility of
arbitrage. With sufficient arbitrage, the
difference in prices should vanish.
Therefore, pricing-to-market is more
likely to be found in industries, such as
the car industry, in which products are
tailored to local requirements.
Paul Froot and Paul
Klemperer provide another explana-
tion for pricing-to-market. Their
model relies on the observation that
future demand for some firm￿s product
may depend on the firm￿s current
market share. In their framework, the
higher the current market share, the
higher future demand will be. Such a
relationship between current market
share and future demand could arise
because it is costly for consumers to
switch brands. For example, a con-
sumer may be unwilling to substitute a
brand he has little information on for
one he has tried and liked.
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of goods to respond slowly to changes
in the economy. Suppose some change
in the economy causes a change in the
nominal exchange rate. Since the
prices of goods are slow to react (and
since the real exchange rate equals the
nominal exchange rate times the ratio
of price indexes), real and nominal
exchange rates should move approxi-
mately in line with each other.
Therefore, flexible exchange-rate
systems, in which nominal exchange








1951 1957 1963 1969 1975 1981 1987 1993 1999
Real
Exchange
Rate  Business Review  Q1 2001   23 www.phil.frb.org
One property of pricing-to-
market is that firms do not necessarily
pass through movements in nominal
exchange rates to the prices they
charge in foreign countries, especially
if the change in the exchange rate is
temporary. Imagine, for example, that
a U.S. firm sells its product in the
United States and in Canada and that
it is able to price to market. Suppose,
moreover, that, as Froot and
Klemperer argue, the firm￿s future
demand for its product in each country
depends on its current share of the
market in each country.  If the
Canadian dollar were to temporarily
depreciate vis-￿-vis the U.S. dollar, the
U.S. firm￿s profits would fall. The firm
would get fewer U.S. dollars in
exchange for each Canadian dollar it
earns. The firm might react to the
depreciation of the Canadian dollar by
raising the price it charges Canadian
consumers; that is, the U.S. firm might
pass through the depreciation of the
Canadian dollar to Canadian consum-
ers. However, if the firm cares about its
market share in Canada, it may prefer
to keep constant the price it charges
there, resulting in a cut in the firm￿s
current profits.
In other words, pricing-to-
market can engender price stickiness
in local markets. Because of that
stickiness, movements in the nominal
exchange rate get translated into
movements in the real exchange rate.
Thus, pricing-to-market helps account
for the high volatility of real exchange
rates since 1973. And pricing-to-
market can also help explain why the
rest of the economy is unaffected by
large movements in real exchange
rates. Since, under pricing-to-market,
movements in nominal exchange rates
do not necessarily get passed through
to consumer prices, consumers would
have no incentives to switch from one
good to another. Therefore, we would
not expect production, consumption,
investment, and net exports to respond
strongly to exchange-rate movements
if most firms price to market. Conse-
quently, the high volatility of exchange
rates would not be transmitted to
other variables in the economy. In fact,
many studies have uncovered pricing-
to-market in manufacturing industries.
For instance, a study by Joseph
Gagnon and Michael Knetter found
that, instead of changing the price that
they charge for their products in the
United States, Japanese automobile
exporters offset 70 percent of ex-
change-rate changes by adjusting
profits.
Recently, researchers have
built numerical models incorporating
information on various aspects of the
world economy to investigate how
much changes in economic fundamen-
tals (for instance, changes in monetary
policy or movements in productivity)
can account for the movements in
exchange rates since 1973. The first
wave of such models put the emphasis
on perfectly competitive industries and
movements in fundamentals driven
primarily by changes in productivity
across countries.11  These frameworks
were only partially successful at
explaining the behavior of exchange
rates, especially their high volatilities.
In particular, they could not explain
the large movements in real exchange
rates that are due to the failure of the
law of one price.
As a result, a second genera-
tion of numerical models tries to make
sense of the large movements in
building on these previous studies,
combined pricing-to-market and price
stickiness to study the effects of
exchange-rate regimes on the economy
and found that these features could
explain why the higher variability of
real exchange rates since 1973 did not
get transmitted to other economic
variables. Figure 5, which shows the
simulated time series for the real
exchange rate, output, and net exports
from our model, indicates that the
model captures the empirical facts
illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. Looking
at the movements of the real exchange
rate, an observer would be able to
easily select the date at which the
switch in exchange-rate regime
occurred. However, looking only at the
simulated series for output and net
exports from our model economy, the




system matter? Looking at the Bretton
Woods system and the flexible ex-
change-rate system that followed, this
article showed that although real
exchange rates have been much more
volatile under the current flexible
exchange-rate system, this high
exchange rates under the current
flexible exchange-rate regime by
emphasizing imperfectly competitive
industries with price stickiness and
pricing-to-market, and changes in
monetary policy.12 These models have
had relatively more success in explain-
ing exchange-rate movements.
Recently, Luca Dedola and I,
Japanese automobile exporters offset 70 percent of
exchange-rate changes by adjusting profits.
11 See the article by David Backus, Patrick
Kehoe, and Finn Kydland.
12 See the articles by Caroline Betts and
Michael Devereux; V.V. Chari, Patrick Kehoe,
and Ellen McGrattan; and Robert Kollman.
volatility has not been transmitted to
other sectors of the economy, at least
not in the world￿s major industrial
countries. In a sense, the early critics
of flexible exchange-rate systems were
half right. They were correct in
predicting that exchange rates would
be highly volatile if market forces
determined them. However, their
prediction of a lower trade volume,
lower output, and overall lower
standards of living did not materialize
after the demise of the Bretton Woods
system. In fact, in his 1989 book, Paul
Krugman argues that flexible exchange
rates ￿can move so much precisely
because they seem to matter so little.￿24   Q1 2001 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
Does that mean that any type
of exchange-rate system would suit any
country? Probably not. Depending on
the economic situation, a country
could be harmed by its choice of an
exchange-rate system. For instance,
some researchers have shown that
countries that left the gold standard in
the early years of the Great Depression
suffered much less than countries that
kept their currency fixed to gold (see
the book by Barry Eichengreen). This
finding provides some evidence that
the exchange-rate system matters, at
least in drastic situations, and that the
efforts of policymakers and academics
to devise and understand different
exchange-rate arrangements are
important.  Moreover, the recent
experience of some emerging markets,
such as East Asia or Latin America,
suggests that exchange-rate volatility
may very well matter for small, open
economies, even though it does not
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seem to matter much for larger,
industrial countries. Indeed, a recent
study by Shinji Takagi and Yushi
Yoshida shows that Japanese firms
exporting to East Asia, to a very large
extent, do not price to market. As a
result, movements in nominal ex-
change rates get transmitted into local
prices, which then affect consumption,
production, and employment. Thus,
unlike residents of industrial countries,
those in small, open economies may
very well care about exchange-rate
volatility and which exchange-rate
system is in place in their countries.  Business Review  Q1 2001   25 www.phil.frb.org
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